



















On various occasions (1973, 1990, 2002) Kendall Walton has put forward a theory of depiction based on the notion of make-believe: P depicts something only if in virtue of having a perception of P, one makes believe that that very experience is the perception of P’s subject. As a consequence, if an individual is not able to make believe, whatever they face in their perception does not count as a depiction for her. Yet there are many evidences from developmental psychology that show that very little children still unable to make believe can grasp a picture’s figurative value. As a result, Walton’s theory of depiction seems to be inadequate from an empirical point of view. Moreover, it also appears to be inadequate from a conceptual point of view. Walton’s ambition is to account in pretence-theoretical terms of what the twofold experience of seeing-in, which Wollheim took to be a necessary condition of depiction, amounts to. Yet relying on make-believe, hence on imagination, does not account for the genuinely perceptual character of the “seeing-in” experience. No treatment of imagination in terms of visualization seems to achieve such a purpose.
1. Walton’s Make-believe Theory of Depiction
In exploiting the notion of make-believe in order to account for various phenomena of representation, both artistic and non-artistic, Walton has also developed a make-believe theory of depiction. In a nutshell, the problem of depiction is the following: over and above verbal representations, there are many other kinds of representations that are non-verbal, and pictorial: paintings, drawings, sketches.​[1]​ Now, what makes a representation “pictorial,” what gives it its “figurative” character? In several texts (1973, 1990, 2002), Walton gives this question the following answer: a representation P is a pictorial representation, depicting its subject matter, only if in virtue of having a perception of P, one makes believe that that very experience is the perception of such a subject matter.
Let us consider this characterization more in detail, which for Walton yields only a necessary condition of depiction, as I have just underlined.​[2]​ To begin with, the real perceptual experience of the object an individual actually faces—let us say a certain canvas, in the case of a painting, for instance Raphael’s Madonna del Granduca—is a prop of the fictional perceptual experience of the subject that object represents, say, the Virgin and Child.​[3]​ The former experience is a prop of the latter experience in the very same sense in which, for Walton, in a game in which one makes believe that some globs of mud are cakes, the real globs of mud are props of the cakes that fictionally exist. In either case, props are real things that, given their features, put constraints on one’s imagination. If it is really the case that there are three globs of mud over there and the middle glob is bigger than the other two globs, then it is fictionally the case that there are three cakes over there and the middle cake is bigger than the other cakes. Analogously, if it is really the case that I am having a perception of a canvas with certain colour spots, it is fictionally the case that I am having a perception of the Virgin and Child. As a result, not only must the fictional perceptual experience go hand in hand with the real perceptual experience, but the latter must somehow (i.e. in virtue of some of its features) trigger the former. 
Now, Walton goes on, nothing along these lines happens in the case of a verbal rather than a pictorial representation. If I read the phrase “the Madonna and Child,” I can certainly imagine that I see the Madonna and Child, maybe even the very subject Raphael depicted. Yet there must be no particular connection between my real perceptual experience—that very reading of that phrase—and my imagined perceptual experience of the Madonna with Child. In order for it to be imaginatively true that I see the Virgin’s left arm holding the baby, it has definitely not to be really true that I see the name “(the) Madonna” to stand on the left of the name “Child.” In order for the former to be imaginatively true, it has not even to be really true that I read such a phrase. 
Moreover, for Walton in the case of depiction the real perceptual experience of the representation figures in the content of the fictional perceptual experience of the subject that representation represents.​[4]​ The perceiver indeed makes believe that their very perception of that representation is the perception of its subject. Again, nothing along these lines happens in the case of the experience of a verbal representation. If I read “the Madonna and Child,” I can well imagine the Madonna and Child, may be even Raphael’s Madonna and Child. Yet I do not make believe that the perceptual experience I have in reading that phrase is the experience of the Madonna and Child.
2. A Critique of Walton’s Theory 
from an Empirical Viewpoint
Whatever conception one has of the relationship between philosophy and science, one must agree that a good philosophical theory has to square with all the empirical data it tries to explain or interpret. If we now consider the empirical data coming from cognitive sciences, in developmental psychology in particular, it may be questioned that this is the case of Walton’s theory of depiction, insofar as it appeals to make-believe. 
To begin with, from the point of view of developmental psychology we can now take for granted that children manifest​[5]​ the capacity of making believe when they are eighteen months old,​[6]​ if not when they are twenty-seven months old, namely when they can discriminate between understanding/producing a certain piece of behaviour as an act of make-believe and understanding/producing the very same piece of behaviour as a frustrated attempt at doing something. For example, at that age they can tell making believe that one is drinking milk from an empty glass from unsuccessfully attempting to drink milk from one such glass.​[7]​ Since, as we have seen, Walton’s theory accounts for depiction by appealing to experiences that involve make-believe, it should follow that individuals that are unable to make believe cannot have such experiences, hence that the representations such individuals face are not pictorial representations. More precisely, such representations are not depictions for those individuals. In actual fact, Walton’s aforementioned necessary condition for something to be a pictorial representation is a necessary condition for something to be such for a society.​[8]​ Hence, the fact that something does not count as a depiction for an individual that has not yet manifested the capacity of making believe does not obviously show that for the very society to which such an individual belongs that very something does not count as a depiction, insofar as that capacity is manifested by other individuals of that society.
Let us now ask ourselves the following question: are individuals that have not yet manifested the capacity of making believe really unable to have experiences by means of which they grasp the figurative value of a pictorial representation? If we consider data coming again from developmental psychology, it seems that we must answer that question negatively. Some papers on this (Deloache et al. 1979; Deloache & Burns 1994; Deloache et al. 1998; Deloache et al. 2003) have indeed established the following results. Between five and nineteen months of age, children become able to grasp precisely the figurative value of pictorial representations; between nineteen and thirty months of age, they can understand their representational value. For my present purposes, the first capacity is definitely more important than the second, as it turns out that that very capacity is manifested definitely before children manifest the capacity of making believe. As a result, pace Walton, the representations in question can be understood in their figurative value by those children, even though they are still unable to make believe, as such representations already exhibit to those children what makes them pictorial representations, namely their figurative value.
Let us look at the situation in more detail. Theoretically speaking, understanding pictorial representations involves at least the following steps, which may also be conceived as stages in the development of such an understanding:
(1)	Perceiving such representations in their materiality;
(2)	Misrecognizing such representations as the subjects they represent;
(3)	Experiencing such subjects in such representations; 
(4)	Taking those representations as representations of such subjects.
In step (1), one perceives pictorial representations as mere material objects. Though thin, a canvas or a sheet of paper is just a jumble of colour spots a perceiver perceives among many other three-dimensional objects in their ordinary transactions. In step (2), one begins to recognize the subjects those representations represent, as one would do if they met those subjects face to face. However, what is really going on in such a step is misrecognition, for one erroneously takes the representation as the subject it represents. In step (3), that misrecognition becomes aware, for the perceiver flanks it with an aware perception of the representation in its materiality. One knows that they are perceiving such a representation, yet cannot but also see that representation as its subject. Put in a different way, in consciously seeing the representation, one also consciously sees its subject in it. This is the “seeing-in” phenomenon originally noticed in modern times by Alberti and Leonardo in seeing animals in clouds, humans in rocks, or battles in marble cracks. As is well-known, Wollheim considered this “seeing-in” experience as a necessary condition of pictorial representation.​[9]​ Finally, in step (4), one takes the representation in which they already see the subject it represents as a very representation of that subject. As a result of that operation, for the perceiver that very representation also depicts its subject: it not only represents such a subject, but also represents that subject in a pictorial way. Therefore, if in this step a perceiver once again faces Raphael’s painting, she not only sees the Madonna and Child in it, but also takes it as a representation of the Madonna and Child. Hence, that painting is for her a depiction of the Madonna and Child.
If we now match the previous empirical results on child development with the above steps, we can say that five-month-old children pass from step (1) to step (2). At that age, when children face pictorial representations they are indeed able to misrecognize the subjects they represent, as they react to such representations as they would react if they met their subjects face to face. As to the dating of the passage from step (2) to step (3), things are more complicated. On the one hand, some pieces of behaviour of five-months-old children would manifest the mastery of step (3). For such children can already tell pictorial representations from the subject such representations represent: if such children face both a representation and its subject, they do not mistake the former as the latter. On the other hand, however, five-month up to nine-month old children seem to display only mastery of step (2). If they face a pictorial representation only, such children exhibit an explorative behaviour, for they try to grasp or touch only those parts of the representation that present relevant parts of the subject such a representation represents. E.g., if a child faces the photo of a feeder, she tries to suck that part of the photo that presents the feeder’s nipple, or at least to touch it by means of her lips.​[10]​ To be sure, we may remove such a tension by interpreting the whole behaviour of such children as falling under step (2): when they face a pictorial representation only, such children mistake that representation as its subject, but they can’t obviously make that mistake if they simultaneously face both the representation and its subject. However, when children are fifteen months old they pass to step (3), for an utterly new way of behaving arises. At that age, a child tends to no longer touch the representation and instead indicates its subject, as we adults normally do when we focus our attention to the subject a pictorial representation represents rather than to the representation itself. As Deloache and her coauthors acknowledge, we may say that a child of that age sees a certain subject in a pictorial representation.​[11]​ At nineteen months, moreover, the exploring behaviour definitely disappears and only the indicating behaviour takes place. Deloache and her collaborators would probably say that we may already rank that piece of behaviour under step (4), in which the pictorial representation is also taken as a representation, hence as a depiction. Maybe this is too hasty on their part, since according to their own results, real evidences of step (4) are to be found later, from twenty-four month old children onwards. At that age, children indeed use pictorial representations as a guide for action, for they pictorially represent how things might be. At thirty months of age, finally, children indeed use pictorial representations in order to pictorially represent how things are.
We can now evaluate the empirical results thus interpreted. As Walton explicitly holds, his pretence-theoretical proposal is a way to exploit Wollheim’s (19802) idea that a necessary condition of depiction is a “seeing-in” experience: that is, if something depicts, then a perceiver has a twofold experience in which they directly see that something and indirectly experience its subject in it.​[12]​ For Walton, this fold prima facie consisting in an indirect experience of the picture’s subject really is the fictional experience according to which the perception of the representation make-believedly is the perception of the representation’s subject.​[13]​ However, we have just seen that in a child’s development a “seeing-in” experience may take place at least three months before their manifestation of make-believe understanding, when children are fifteen months old rather than eighteen months old. Thus, we can well acknowledge that a twofold experience containing as its second part an indirect experience of a picture’s subject has to take place in someone’s mind in order for something to work for them as a pictorial representation. However, from an empirical point of view it is doubtful that this fold of indirect experience has to be interpreted as a make-believe perception, or more precisely, as the fact that a perception of a pictorial representation make-believedly is a perception of that representation’s subject, as Walton wishes.
3. Walton’s Possible Replies 
Given the above data, a first accommodation Walton might provide would be to reconsider the appeal to make-believe in such a way that it yields both a necessary and a sufficient condition of depiction. In this way, that condition would not only account for the figurativity of a depiction – what makes a pictorial representation pictorial – but also for the intentionality of a depiction – what makes a pictorial representation represent something. Insofar as understanding the intentionality of a depiction concerns step 4) above, a child’s developmental situation may well involve the fact that the understanding of make-believe temporally precedes the understanding of a depiction. Thus, no empirical problem arises any longer. Let us see how this move works.
According to Walton’s accommodation, a pictorial representation P depicts that something is F iff (i), given that P has certain features, one makes believe that that very something is F, and (ii) in virtue of perceiving P, one makes believe that that very perceiving is the perception that that very something is F.​[14]​ By this definition, making believe accounts not only for the figurativeness of a pictorial representation—condition (ii)—but also for its intentionality, condition (i). Since one and the same factor—making believe—accounts for what constitutes a pictorial representation as a sign endowed of its particular significance, it is vain to account for a picture’s figurativeness in terms of an experiential element, if this element has nothing to do with make-believe. As a result, even if such an element occurs in someone’s development before one manifests its understanding of make-believe, that element is totally irrelevant in order to elucidate what is being depicted, in particular what is being depicted for someone.
However, such a move has a problematic presupposal. According to such a move, it is not the case, as we have supposed all along, that a representation possesses its figurative character, if any, independently of its being a representation. Put alternatively, according to such a move, depicting is a symbolic activity per se and it is only derivatively a way of representing.​[15]​ Yet the burden of proof that this is the case is on the defender of such a presupposal. An undeniable starting point on pictures is that pictures are “pictures-of,” i.e. they have a content. Perhaps unlike sentences they have no illocutionary force, nor are they decomposable in the very same way in which sentences are;​[16]​ yet they precisely have a content that makes them semantically evaluable as correct or incorrect pictures of reality.​[17]​ Definitely, we use the notion of a picture in this way; if we said that something failing to have semantic features is a picture, it would be like speaking of a rod that has no length.​[18]​ Yet this holds of pictures insofar as they are representations; given our notion of a representation, there cannot be a representation that is not a representation of something, that fails to have a content that makes it semantically evaluable. Of course we can change our notion of a representation, hence of a picture, hence also their extensions, yet we have to find a justification for that change. Thus, to provide a theory of depiction is to provide a theory of pictures which also are representations, in the standard meaning of “picture” and “representation.” Moreover, it does not appear that Walton himself may appeal to this move. As we have seen, by appealing to make-believe he aims at providing a better understanding of Wollheim’s notion of seeing-in, by clarifying in terms of a fictional perceptual experience precisely what Wollheim meant by speaking of a proper “seeing in”-fold of the twofold “seeing-in” experience. Yet Wollheim is very clear in saying that not all the things that prompt a “seeing-in” experience of something are also representations of that very something, by thus splitting the figurative and the intentional character of a representation.​[19]​ Therefore, for Walton it is hard to appeal to such an alternative approach to the notion of depiction.​[20]​ 
At this point, Walton might perform a more reasonable move. Since the results I have appealed to are empirical, they can be questioned, or better one can question the interpretation of them I have provided. One might indeed say that if the capacity of seeing the subject in a representation properly flourishes when a child is nineteen months old, we can date step (3) at this age and therefore match such a flourish with the manifestation of the understanding of make-believe, which takes place exactly at that age.
However, this interpretation of the data is quite unlikely. First of all, note that the data found in developmental psychology also suggested that the “seeing-in” capacity already manifests itself when children are five months old. To be sure, this suggestion has been ruled out by the fact that, from the age of five months to nineteen months, children exhibit an explorative behaviour, which I have up to now interpreted as typical of step (2), the one involving misrecognition of a pictorial representation of its subject. Yet this kind of behaviour might even be interpreted as typical of step (1), in which children face pictures merely in their materiality. In actual fact, a pictorial representation is a material object; a child might want to explore it as such. In favour of this interpretation, one may well take into account the further fact that, as Deloache and her co-authors point out, children are never disappointed by the fact that the pictorial representation turns out not to be the subject it represents,​[21]​ as they should be if their explorative behaviour were tied, as I have hitherto supposed, with mistaking the representation as its subject. In the same vein, the fact that this explorative behaviour declines when children are fifteen months old and disappears when they are nineteen months old might be explained by the fact that children progressively lose interest in a pictorial representation qua material object, for they become progressively interested in what such a representation shows beyond itself. As any person competent with pictures does, unless they are for some reason interested in the pictures’ materiality (for instance if one wants to restore them). In any case, the fact that after merely fifteen months of age children manifest an indicative behaviour cannot be accounted for in terms of misrecognizing the picture as its subject, the feature typical of step (2). Pointing is directed upon the represented subject not because one mistakes the picture as such a subject, but because such a subject is what is seen in the picture. This is testified by the fact that pointing children precisely attempt (possibly even in a verbal way) at deviating their interlocutors’ attention from the picture itself to its subject.​[22]​ So all in all, if the data I have relied upon have to be reinterpreted, a reinterpretation that predates the manifestation of pictorial understanding is more plausible than another favourable to Walton that post-dates it. Up to now, therefore, it remains established that Walton’s theory of depiction has empirical counterexamples.​[23]​
4. A Critique of Walton’s Theory 
from a Conceptual Viewpoint
Of course, the above predicament does not block any possible reply on Walton’s behalf. Even if it were taken for granted that in a child’s development the capacity relevant to grasp a picture’s figurativeness manifests itself before the capacity of making believe, as I have stated all along, Walton might say that the latter capacity is innate but is somehow inhibited in its manifesting up to nineteen months.​[24]​
More radically, Walton might say that the above results are not pertinent, since as his constant appeal to the idea that a picture has a function insofar as it works a prop in visual games of make-believe​[25]​ reveals, his notion of pictorial understanding has to be basically “social,” not individualistic. Therefore, whatever is relevant for pictorial understanding as conceived individualistically may well not be relevant for pictorial understanding as conceived socially.
As a result, a radical critique of Walton’s position cannot arise out of empirical, but rather of conceptual problems. As we have seen, Walton claims that his appeal to make-believe may account for what remains elusive in Wollheim’s theory of depiction, namely, to say what the proper “seeing-in” element of the whole “seeing-in” experience, the indirect experience of a picture’s subject, really consists of. According to Walton, what for Wollheim is the indirect experience of the picture’s subject is rather a “make-believe experience”; more precisely, the perceptual experience of the picture is make-believedly the perceptual experience of its subject. Yet Wollheim has often replied to Walton that this explanation does not account for the genuinely perceptual character of the “seeing-in” aspect that contributes to making the whole “seeing-in” experience a genuinely (though sui generis) perceptual experience.​[26]​ In what follows, I will try to show that Wollheim is basically right in his reply.
To begin with, let me briefly recap Walton’s theory of make-believe. Walton has a normative conception of make-believe as rules in a game (prompted by the features of the things that count as props in such a game) for one’s imagination. In other words, making believe that p means prescribing (via props) to imagining that p.​[27]​ In the case of depiction, the relevant make-believe game that gives rules to one’s imagination involves one’s perceptual experience of the picture which, as we saw before, counts both as a prop and as a content of the imagination. This is to say that making believe that one’s perceptual experience of the picture is the perceptual experience of its subject is prescribing to imagine (via the fact that the former experience is a prop of the latter experience) that the former is the latter. 
Now, in order to see whether this account saves Wollheim’s desideratum as regards the perceptual character of seeing-in, we have to wonder whether to imagine that p has a suitable experiential character. In general, imagining that p may mean either (i) supposing that p, as based on representing (in an imaginary context) that p occurs in an imaginary world (the world of that context) or (ii) visualizing that p.​[28]​ In the case of our make-believe experience, therefore, imagining that one’s experience of the picture is the experience of its subject is either (i’) ultimately representing (in an imaginary context) that one’s perception of the picture is the perception of its subject in an imaginary world (the world of that context) or (ii’) visualizing that one’s perception of the picture is the perception of its subject. 
Yet as far as our case is concerned, the first interpretation has to be immediately ruled out. Representing (in an imaginary context) that one is perceiving in an imaginary world (the world of that context) has no real phenomenological content, hence it cannot account for the experiential character of the “seeing-in” experience, which has a (distinctive) phenomenology. As many people have stressed, there is a phenomenological shift from perceiving a picture in its materiality to having a “seeing-in” experience that allows one to see a certain subject in that picture.​[29]​ Therefore, the second interpretation naturally suggests itself for visualizing that p has a genuine phenomenological content. 
To be clear from the very beginning, by accounting for imagining in terms of visualizing what is stake here is not whether to imagine something—where this something is an external object, in this case a picture’s subject—means to visualize that very something. This kind of visualization is irrelevant to account for the “seeing-in” experience. As Walton himself stresses, visualizing in this sense a picture’s subject takes place utterly separate from the perceptual experience of the picture itself in its materiality. Not only may the former occur in absence of the latter, but it may also occur along with a non-pictorial perceptual experience, such as when “reading” a text about that very subject.​[30]​  Rather, the point is whether the imagination that affects a certain internal state, the imagination of a certain episode of seeing, can itself be a visualization of that seeing. 
Now, visualizing may well concern an experience. Over and above having a visualization of a certain non-experiential content, one may surely visualize an experience itself, or at least, one may have a fainted experiential replica of that experience. In the same vein, one may vividly recall sensations (e.g. pain) as well as emotions in general. Therefore, there is no principled reason against the idea of visualizing one’s perceptions.
First of all, however, one may wonder whether one can visualize their perception while having that very perception, as Walton postulates. To be sure, certain experiments have shown that one may perceive a certain subject and visualize it at the same time, as in the famous Perky experiment in which perceivers are unknowingly faced with a certain subject, say a yellow banana, and when asked to say what they are imagining, they say they are imagining the very same subject. So why could one not have a perception and a visualization of that perception at one and the same time? Yet in the Perky case, one’s perception of the subject involved is unaware. Whereas in the depiction case one is aware of seeing the picture, such a perception is the first aspect of the whole “seeing in” experience. The problem now is how can the perception of the picture remain aware while having an aware visualization of that perception itself, especially since the visualization of it as having an utterly different content (as concerning not the picture, but the picture’s subject) should prompt that visualization to have an utterly different phenomenal character from the one that perception of the picture possesses?​[31]​  
To be sure, Walton might here bite the bullet and reply that it is precisely this radical difference in phenomenal character between the perception and its visualization (as being of a different thing) that makes them simultaneously compatible in one’s consciousness, so as to possibly merge into a sui generis experience such as the whole “seeing in” experience. The examples he himself recently provides of such a situation are precisely cases in which the phenomenal character of a perception and the phenomenal character of its visualization are substantially different: e.g. one hears a flutist playing in the pit orchestra and at the same time imagines not the very same experience, but rather that that very experience is the experience of hearing Papageno playing “his crude wooden instrument” (Walton 2002, 32).​[32]​ If from the phenomenological point of view the visualization of the perception produced a merely fainted replica of that perception, Walton might go on to say that it would be hard for experiencer to take both into conscious account (this is possibly why in the Perky experiment experiencers take notice of the imagination but not of the perception of the very same subject matter). 
Yet for Walton there is something more problematic than that. One can definitely conceive the impossible but one cannot visualize the impossible (no more than they can perceive it). Yet visualizing that one’s experience of a picture is the experience of its subject would ex absurdo be the same as visualizing the impossibility that a certain experience is another one. This is a general problem concerning imagination. Consider one’s imagining that they themselves are Napoleon. This imagination may well amount to the representation of the impossible situation to the effect that one is identical with Napoleon, or it may be transformed into the representation from the perspective of an imaginary context of the utterly possible situation that the agent of that context is Napoleon, but it cannot be the visualization of the impossible situation to the effect that the visualizer herself is Napoleon.
To be sure, Walton may well reply that to imagine one’s perception to be another perception is simply to imagine of one perception that it is another one. I am unclear as how this could be a suitable reply. First of all, it is unclear to me that for Walton the imagination here involved is a de re, as that reply puts it, and not a de dicto one. For, as I said before, he rather says that to imagine one’s perception to be another perception has the former perception in the content of that imagination.​[33]​ So, the whole content of that imagination would be contradictory—it would amount to imagining that a certain perception is another one—hence something not visualizable. To be sure, Walton might retort that he has changed his mind and that he is no longer taking the imagination in question as a de dicto imagination. In a de re imagination, as the one Walton envisages, I can certainly imagine whatever I like, even an impossibility. Yet if that imagination has to be a visualization, the very same problem reappears for I cannot visualize a certain thing to be another thing, insofar as this again amounts to visualizing an impossible situation to the effect that a certain entity a is another entity b.
Walton would probably rejoinder that I have misunderstood his point. He may well say that, infelicitous formulations aside, what he has meant all along is neither that one imagines that a certain perception is another one, nor that one imagines of such a perception that it is another one. Things are simpler: one is simply imagining, of a certain perception, that its object is different from the one it is actually directed upon, or even more radically, that its content is different from the content it actually has.​[34]​ This raises no problem to visualization. I can certainly visualize, of someone, that her height is different from the height she actually has, if this simply means that I am visualizing that she is taller than she actually is, for example. Therefore, why couldn’t one visualize that her perception has a different content from the one it actually has?
The reason is simple—one can provide different theories of what a content of an intentional state, notably a perception, is. For example, an externalist theory according to which that content is object-involving, or an internalist theory according to which that content involves no object, or even a mix between the two theories stating that content involves both an object and a way of presentation of it.​[35]​ Yet there is a point such theories agree on: having the content of an intentional state contributes to the individuation of such a state.​[36]​ If this is the case, to imagine that a perception has a different content from the one it has is again to imagine an impossibility—again, something that is not visualizable.
Clearly enough, Walton may reject all such theories by saying that whatever a content for an intentional state is, it is just a contingent property for it. Yet he should also say that imagining a perception as having an utterly different content entails that not only that imagination is utterly phenomenologically different from that perception as it actually is, as I have suggested before, but also that the perception that would correspond to such an imagination would be different from the phenomenological point of view. Therefore, not only the content, but also the phenomenal character of a perception would have for him to be a contingent feature of it. Therefore, either Walton rejects both the idea that having a certain content is a necessary property of a perception and the idea that having a certain phenomenal character is also such—a very hard move indeed—or again, no appeal to imagination gives the make-believe experience Walton appeals to in the case of depiction of the proper perceptual construal.
At this point, Walton may perform an utterly different move. What gives the relevant make-believe experience a genuinely perceptual character, he may say, is not the imagining as such that concerns the perception of the picture, namely the imagining that such a perception has a different content from what it actually has, but the imagining for which such a perception works as a prop, namely the imagining that directly concerns the perception of the picture’s subject: the “imagining seeing” of that subject. As regards this imagining, Walton explicitly denies that it amounts to a visualization of that subject.​[37]​ As we have just seen, such a visualization does not supply a pictorial experience of that subject with its alleged perceptual character. Rather, says Walton, this imagining is an imagination in the first person and from an inside perspective: a kind of de se imagination, as he himself says.​[38]​ 
To be sure, if Walton originally maintained that what plays the role of Wollheim’s proper “seeing in” fold is precisely the imagination that the perception of a picture is the perception of its subject, not the mere imagination of the perception of that subject (though prompted by the perception of that picture), this move would amount to an amendment of his position. Be that as it may, it is unclear how this further characterization can be useful. Given one’s perception of a picture, one can de se imagine seeing its subject in the very same sense in which, given one’s grasping three globs of mud, one can de se imagine grasping three cakes. It cannot indeed be the case that “imagining seeing” is special with respect to imagining grasping, or any other imagining F-ing for that matter.​[39]​ For otherwise imagining seeing an object would amount to visualizing that object, which is a form of visual imagery that, as we already know, Walton rightly rules out of consideration in his accounting for depiction. Yet if imagining grasping something, or any other imagining F-ing something, has no specific perceptual character, why should imagining seeing something have such a character?
Once again, the only chance Walton has in order to fulfil his aim is to interpret all such de se imaginings in terms of some sort of visualization.​[40]​ However, since, as we have just seen, a mere visualization of a picture’s subject does not supply a pictorial experience with the expected perceptual character, such visualizations must directly concern the acts involved in the imagined performances, independently of whether such acts are inner or outer. Thus, in de se imagining grasping cakes, one visualizes that (outer) grasping; likewise, in de se imagining seeing a picture’s subject, one visualizes that (inner) seeing. 
Despite this, as Walton himself immediately admits, if a visualization directly concerning the act of seeing a picture’s subject occurred in isolation or it simply accompanied the perception of the picture itself, it would not provide the whole pictorial experience the perceptual character it should have, as he seems to concede to Wollheim.​[41]​ For one such visualization may well also occur in the case of a reading experience of a text about the subject in question. 
Therefore, in order to get the desired result, Walton should strengthen his claim: a whole pictorial experience may have, as Wollheim wishes, a genuinely perceptual character just in case in virtue of perceiving a certain picture, one also visualizes perceiving the picture’s subject.
Yet, in order to check whether Walton’s theory fulfils Wollheim’s desideratum, it all depends on what “in virtue of” in the above claim amounts to. If it points toward a mere causal process that happens in the case of perceiving a picture but not in the case of perceiving a text, that process may well be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the whole pictorial experience to be genuinely perceptual. Unlike my perceiving a text, my perceiving a picture prompts me to visualize seeing its subject. But insofar as this visualization only causally depends on that perception, the two experiences remain separated. In the very same sense, it might be remarked that a perception of a picture prompts a certain perceiver to have an emotional experience, e.g. to feel sad; yet this prompting would not amount to letting that perceiver have the unitary perceptual experience of seeing the picture as sad. As Walton himself acknowledges, he wants something more: “a viewer who sees a horse in a picture … is best regarded not as seeing the picture and also engaging in this spontaneous imagining, but as enjoying a single experience that is both perceptual and imaginative, her perception of the picture is colored by the imagining … a perceptual experience that is also an imaginative one” (2008, 137–8). But it is not clear how he can achieve this result on the basis of what he says as regards the relation between perceiving a picture and visualizing a perception of its subject.​[42]​, ​[43]​
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^1	  This pre-theoretical list also includes static and moving images such as photographs and films. To be sure, Walton (1984) provides a different account of these latter kinds of pictorial representations, by drawing a preliminary distinction between “opaque” and “transparent” pictures (to which the latter kinds belong), Yet for my purposes I will set this distinction aside.
^2	  Walton (1973) specifies that this is a necessary condition of a P-depiction, namely a depiction whose subject is “generic” (e.g. a genre-picture such as a painting by Claude Lorrain depicting a landscape with ancient ruins) and not of “depictiond,” namely a depiction of a specific existing subject (e.g. a painting by Canaletto of Piazza San Marco, Venice). In Walton (1990) he does not appeal again to such a distinction. Be that as it may, this distinction is inessential for my present purposes, for Walton also holds that every depictiond is a P-depiction. Canaletto’s painting of Piazza S. Marco is still a painting of an urban square.
^3	  Walton (1990, 301).
^4	  Walton (1990, 294).
^5	  There are reasons both to hold that both the capacity of making believe and the capacity of pictorial understanding are innate capacities that are triggered at a certain point of an individual’s development and to hold that they are not such. Following Walton himself (1973), I will not take a stance on this. In order to remain neutral on those positions, I limit myself to talking of the “manifestation” of such capacities.
^6	  As both Piaget (1962) and Vygotsky (1967) originally discovered and Leslie (1987) confirmed in his psychological theory of mind.
^7	  Rakoczy et al. (2004), Rakoczy-Tomasello (2006).
^8	  Walton (1973, 312–5).
^9	  Wollheim (19802). On the interpretation of the proper “seeing-in” fold of the “seeing in” experience as a case of seeing-as, see Levinson (1998) and my own Voltolini (2012).
^10	  One may realize that here ontogenesis recaps philogenesis. As far as tribes that ex hypothesi have been never in touch with pictures are concerned, we find the same indeterminacy, insofar we are unsure as to whether some pieces of behaviour of the members of such tribes fall under step (2) or under step (3). On this point, see Prinz (1993).
^11	  Deloache et al. (1998, 209) and (2003, 115). Literally, Deloache and her collaborators say that children of that age “see through” a pictorial representation to its subject. In the literature on depiction, however, the phrase “seeing through” is used to mean the further experience featuring a purported kind of depiction, the so-called transparent pictures entertaining a causal relationship (as I said above in fn.1, photographs and films are the paradigmatic case of such pictures: see Walton [1984]). Following Wollheim (19802), in order to highlight the experience one has when one directly sees a pictorial representation and indirectly experiences its subject, the phrase used in such a literature is “seeing in” instead.
^12	  Walton (1990,  300–1), (2002, 33).
^13	  Walton (1990, 300–1), (1991), (2002, 33).
^14	  Walton (1973, 312–5).
^15	  To be sure, some theories explicitly adopt this standpoint. See Abell (2009), Blumson (2009).
^16	  As Gombrich (1982) and Fodor (2007) have respectively held.
^17	  As Fodor (2007, 108) himself acknowledges.
^18	  For this example, see notoriously Wittgenstein (1953, §251).
^19	  Wollheim (19802, 206–8), (1987, 46–8).
^20	  Walton is partially aware of this problem. On the one hand, he insists on that if make-believe thoroughly accounts for depiction, it must also account for how a pictorial representation represents. See Walton (1990, 351–2). Yet on the other hand, he repeatedly says that depicting is a kind of representing, by thus espousing the traditional standpoint. See Walton (1990, 292, 297).
^21	  Deloache et al. (1998, 209).
^22	  Deloache et al. (1998, 209), (2004, 116–7).
^23	  Interestingly, Deloache et al. (1994, 106–7), (1998, 209–10) say that the decoupling mechanism that quarantines certain representations from others belongs to step (4), the one involving the recognition of a pictorial representation qua representation, rather than to step (3), concerning the manifestation of a “seeing-in” capacity. For Leslie (1987), the decoupling mechanism mentally operates precisely when make-believe is at play. If this were the case, it would turn out that the capacity relevant to grasp a picture’s figurativity manifests itself before the capacity of making believe.
^24	  This is the move people in cognitive psychology typically adopt to explain why, if the so-called “false beliefs test” is sound, the meta-representational capacity fully displays itself in humans only after the age of four years. See Leslie-Thaiss (1992).
^25	  Walton (1990, 51–3, 58–60, 91–2).
^26	  Wollheim (1991, 40–5), (2003, 146).
^27	  Walton (1990, 39–41).
^28	  Someone holds that imagining that p amounts to simulating that p. Cf. e.g. Abell-Currie (1999). Yet since this interpretation traces imagining back to pretending, it cannot serve in analyzing making-believe. Hence, I leave it aside.
^29	  See for example Hopkins (1998, 15).
^30	  On such criticisms see Walton himself (1991, 425), (2008, 135).
^31	  For this criticism, see Nanay (2004, 288), who reprises and fully articulates a problem raised by Wollheim himself (1998, 224).
^32	  Pace Nanay (2004, 228). I take the other example Walton provides to be interpreted just in the same way. Suppose one hears at home an orchestra’s recordings. In such a case, one directly hears a certain music actually coming from one’s loudspeakers, and thereby indirectly hears the music actually coming from the orchestra that was recorded, and imagines that that very experience of directly hearing the sounds coming from the loudspeakers is the (phenomenally different) experience of directly hearing the sounds coming from the orchestra.
^33	  See fn.3.
^34	  Walton (1990, 293), (2002, 32), (2008, 137).
^35	  In Nanay (2004, 286), Nanay recalls this third option.
^36	  See also Maynard (1994, 162).
^37	  Walton (1991, 425).
^38	  Walton (1990, 29–30), (2008, 137). 
^39	  In the present volume, Walton implicitly confirms that this is the case. For, as he says, in imagining seeing something, “seeing is in the content of the imagining” (Walton 2012).
^40	  It is not so clear that Walton may conceive such de se imaginings in these terms, for he allows that one may also de se imagine, in this sense, being someone else (1990, 32). This amounts to imagining an impossibility, hence something hardly visualizable, as I said before, but let me put this problem aside.
^41	  Walton (2008, 137).
^42	  To be sure, he once suggested that imagining one’s perception of the picture to be the perception of its subject provides the required integration (Walton 1990, 331). Yet, as we have seen before, this is precisely the element that we have previously ruled out in order to account, in Walton’s terms, for the purportedly perceptual character of the pictorial experience.
^43	  I thank Bence Nanay and Ken Walton for their helpful comments on previous versions of this paper.
